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 This paper examines John Stuart Mill’s idea of philosophical tol-
erance. The goal of this paper is to show that the role of philosophical 
tolerance, in the light of the idea of tragic choice, should be extended. 
Mill saw philosophical tolerance as a corrective tool by which we can 
enrich and correct our own ideas. Tragic choice, however, entails that 
certain ideas and values are mutually exclusive. When faced with 
such a choice, one can not use philosophical tolerance as a method of 
justifying one’s own view, but as a tool to accept the loss and the sac-
rifice that has to be made. 
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Introduction  
 In this paper I want to explore John Stuart Mill’s notion of philosophical 
tolerance. The method of philosophical tolerance means taking ideas we ini-
tially disagree with and using them to enrich and correct our own thought. 
This method played a crucial role in Mill’s intellectual development, culmi-
nating in his argument for freedom of thought and discussion, as presented 
in his essay “On Liberty”. In his autobiography Mill is modest in praising his 
“own powers as original thinker”, but he did think that his superiority to 
most of his contemporaries came from the “willingness and ability to learn 
from everybody” (Mill, 1971: 146). Even systems of thought completely op-
posed to his own – that of Coleridge, Carlyle or the German Idealist – had 
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something to offer him. Although he found them mostly erroneous, there 
were still certain truths to be learned from them.  
 Mill saw philosophical tolerance as a corrective tool. We should explore 
rival ideas to correct, change or affirm our own concepts. When in his auto-
biography Mill discusses his method in political philosophy he refers to a 
medieval allegory of two knights approaching a shield hanging from a tree 
from opposite directions. The first knight thinks the shield is black; the other 
thinks it is white. They begin to argue and then fight over the colour of the 
shield until a third knight shows up and shows them that one side of the 
shield is black and the other white (Mill, 1971: 98). In matters of philosophi-
cal ideas Mill, undoubtedly, saw himself as being the third knight. 
 I, however, want to suggest that the method of philosophical tolerance 
can and should be used as more than just a corrective tool. There are cases 
where two conflicting ideas or values necessarily exclude each other and 
there is no way we can take them both into account or achieve compromise 
between them. As a result, one of these ideas or values will have to be sacri-
ficed. These are – as Isaiah Berlin called them – situations of tragic choice. It 
is not that philosophical tolerance is useless in such cases, rather its role 
should be extended. In situations of tragic choice philosophical tolerance can 
help us not only to recognize why a certain value is being sacrificed but also 
to accept the inevitability of such a choice. Because Mill thought we can use 
the utilitarian principle to resolve such tragic situations, he did not think of 
them as being tragic; hence, philosophical tolerance had only a corrective 
role for him. Yet, if I can show that utilitarianism cannot help us in situations 
of tragic choice I will also be able to defend the extended role philosophical 
tolerance can play. 
 In the first part of the paper I will analyse the notion of philosophical 
tolerance, the method of imagination and their connection to Mill’s views on 
progress. In the second part, I will introduce the pluralist ideas of conflict of 
values and tragic choice. Also, I will investigate whether Mill’s utilitarian-
ism can give a convincing answer to situation of tragic choice. In conclusion 
I will return to the notion of philosophical tolerance and suggest a review of 
its scope in the light of the argument of tragic choice.   
 
Philosophical Tolerance, Imagination and Progress 
 In his essay on Coleridge Mill introduced the notion of philosophical 
tolerance, by which he means the ability of taking opposing views from our 
own into account. There is a value in “agonistic modes of thought: which, it 
will one day be felt, are as necessary to one another in speculation, as mutu-
ally checking powers are in political constitution” (Mill, 1973:399). One has 
to use, what Mill calls, imagination – “the power by which one human being 
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enters into mind and circumstances of another” (Mill, 1973:354), to be able 
to enter “the modes of thought opposite to his own” (Mill, 1973:352). It is 
obvious why this power is essential for historians or anthropologists whose 
job is to describe and explain times long gone or foreign and strange cul-
tures; but why would imagination be of such importance to a philosopher 
whose main concern is the question of truth? If our own view is true then the 
opposing view to ours is wrong and does not deserve much attention. Mill 
disagrees and gives a strong argument against this claim: first in his criticism 
of Bentham and latter in “On Liberty”. When talking about Bentham Mill 
concludes that the greatest weakness of his thought was his lack of philoso-
phical imagination. If we make general statements only by the limited 
knowledge of our own experience and the outward conduct of others, we 
will end up, in the best case scenario, with “half-truths” (a term that Mill 
takes from Coleridge). Bentham was talented in “accurate logic… of con-
sistent application of his premises” (Mill, 1973:356). This talent is vital for a 
great philosopher, but it is not sufficient. Equally important is a power of 
imagination, otherwise our premises are always one-sided. It is for this rea-
son that Mill says “when Bentham defends a principle that is wrong it is not 
because his conclusion is logically erroneous, but because he neglects some 
more important principle” (Mill, 1973:356). Bentham “failed in deriving 
light from other minds” (Mill, 1973:350) and never gave deserved attention 
to the notions of conscience, self-respect, honour, dignity or love of beauty, 
putting them all under the heading of general happiness.  
 Mill further explored the argument for philosophical tolerance in the es-
say “On Liberty” when he claimed that in issues of “morals, politics, relig-
ion, social relations… every subject on which difference of opinion is possi-
ble, the truth depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of con-
flicting reasons” (Mill, 1993:104). It is not only our limited experience that 
makes us hold one-sided views – there is also the fact of human fallibility. 
Luckily, human beings can rectify their views not only through personal ex-
perience, but also through discussion with others. This is why we should 
follow the great ancient orators such as Cicero who studied the other side of 
argument with equal or even bigger dedication (Mill, 1993:105). Through 
imagination we try to go beyond the limited realm of personal experience, 
through discussion we consider conflicting ideas as they are presented by 
those who truly believe in them. This led Mill to conclude that :”the only 
way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole 
of the subject, is by hearing what can be said about by persons of every vari-
ety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every 
character of mind… no wise men ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but 
this; nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other 
manner” (Mill, 1993: 88). 
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 This idea is closely connected to Mill’s understanding of progress. As 
Alan Ryan points out, Mill’s notion of progress was not dealing with the im-
provement of national wealth and power, but the improvement of intellectual 
and moral qualities of human beings (Ryan, 1970:184). It is this kind of im-
provement that is characteristic of true progress – progress that can be 
achieved, first and foremost, through open discussion between conflicting 
views. One’s personal progress, just as a progress in issues that Mill calls 
“concerns of life” is to be achieved by “the reconciling and combining of 
opposites” (Mill, 1993:115). Those people who are ready to hear the other 
side of the argument and to expand their experience by the power of imagi-
nation are both intellectually and morally richer for it. 
 However, we should not mistake Mill’s notion of progress for being a 
kind of Hegelian dialectics relying on a teleological understanding of his-
tory. First, Mill never thought that progress leads us to some predestined 
goal, such as the realization of the Idea of Absolute Freedom. History is not 
scripted and if change is inevitable, progress is not. A period of human 
flourishing can be followed by a period of dogmatic uniformity and there is 
nothing, apart from human action, to ensure that this will not happen. Sec-
ond, Hegel’s dialectic scheme of argument (thesis), counter-argument (anti-
thesis) and conclusion that accommodates both the argument and the 
counter-argument (synthesis) suggest there will come a day (“end of his-
tory”, as Hegel called it) when all conflicts between competing ideas will be 
resolved. This is something that Mill never accepted. For him, the idea of an 
age in which there is consensus on all major philosophical or social issues 
was outlandish. It is not that we are never able to achieve agreement or es-
tablish what is true – after all, the core idea behind philosophical toleration is 
to get to the truth by avoiding one-sidedness and half-truths. Rather, tech-
nological and scientific progress, as well as always changing social circum-
stances, give birth to new problems to tackle and new ideas that might help 
us to better understand the world we are living in. Even those ideas that are 
universally accepted as being true have to be questioned from time to time if 
we do not want them to become dogmas. This is what Mill thought when he 
said how “both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as 
there is no enemy in the field” (Mill, 1993: 110). For Mill, the idea of pro-
gress of society and personal improvement is unavoidably connected to the 
conflict of rival ideas. This also goes for the realm of politics where, as Mill 
noted in “Considerations on Representative Government”: “no community 
has ever long continued progressive, but while a conflict was going on be-
tween the strongest power in community and some rival power… when the 
victory on one side was so complete as to put an end to a strife, and no other 
conflict took its place, first stagnation followed, and then decay” (Mill, 
1993:290).  
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 It is also important to note that when Mill talks about philosophical toler-
ance, he sees it as a method of enriching our own ideas and establishing 
truth. He does not advocate compromise between conflicting ideas just for 
the sake of caution or social peace. Mill condemns “English 
mind…shrinking from all extremes. But as this shrinking is rather an instinct 
of caution than a result of insight, it is too ready to satisfy itself with any 
medium, merely because it is a medium, and to acquiesce in a union of the 
disadvantages of both extremes instead of their advantages” (Mill, 
1973:430). He does think that erroneous and superstitious beliefs should be 
abandoned and dismissed, but only as a result of an open discussion. Even 
here, philosophical tolerance can help us understand why people hold these 
kinds of beliefs.  
 A good example of the method of philosophical tolerance, one that Mill 
also wrote about, is that of Tocqueville’s study of the nature of the democ-
ratic system in America. His Democracy in America is an attempt to prove 
that democracy should neither be glorified, nor dismissed. Although he val-
ued equality and freedom above all, he did not fail to notice that an egalitar-
ian and democratic society can have its ugly side in the form of the tyranny 
of majority and in domination of mediocrity, or how education might be-
come significant not for its intrinsic value of self-development but because 
of its instrumental value of achieving economic success. Tocqueville studied 
the advantages and the possible disadvantages of democratic political sys-
tem. I say “possible” because both Tocqueville and Mill believed that these 
disadvantages can be avoided if one analyses them carefully and tries to cor-
rect them. Awareness is the first step to avoid them, institutional reform 
(such as the checks-and-balances system with its division of legal and politi-
cal power between the executive, the judicial and the legislative branches of 
government) is the second. Here, one should listen to what critics are saying, 
instead of just blindly following advocates of democracy who tend to forget 
about the disadvantages that the equality of conditions (for this is what Toc-
queville meant when he talked about democracy) might bring. The point is 
that the shortcomings of democracy can be avoided, as Mill suggests in his 
review of Democracy in America, when he talks about “M. de Touc-
queville’s list of correctives to the inconveniences of Democracy” (Mill, 
1965: 123).  
 
Utilitarianism and Tragic Choice   
 As the example of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America shows, philoso-
phical tolerance should not only apply to ideas, opinions and views, but also 
to values. Often ideas conflict because they imply conflicting values. It is 
because values such as liberty and equality or security and privacy do not go 
hand in hand that we are forced to try to make a compromise between them. 
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However, there are also conflicting values such as justice and mercy, where 
compromise is not possible. In this latter case we are faced with a tragic 
choice. Where a balance can be struck between competing values, we can 
achieve a compromise by partially sacrificing both of these values. Where 
different values are mutually exclusive we have to choose one of them at the 
expense of the other. The choice is tragic because whatever choice we make 
we have lost something valuable. Even if we feel certain that our choice was 
the right one, we are still left with a bitter taste of loss. Pluralist writers such 
as Isaiah Berlin, Bernard Williams and Steven Lukes warn us of the moral 
complexity of the world, in which tragic choice is sometimes inevitable: 
when equally rational but conflicting values clash it is often not possible to 
make a satisfactory equilibrium or compromise between them. As Berlin 
puts it: “if, as I believe, the ends of men are many and not all of them are in 
principle compatible with each other, then the possibility of conflict – and of 
tragedy – can never wholly be eliminated from human life, either personal or 
social” (Berlin, 1969:169) 
 Such a tragic choice could be avoided, or at least its impact reduced, if 
we had a clearly established hierarchy of values. If there is a reference point 
or an ultimate value to which all other values can be measured to, we auto-
matically know how to choose when two values conflict. If one of them is 
sacrificed for the other, at least we are sure that we made the right decision. 
For Mill, this reference point is the utility principle – the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number. The ultimate value is happiness – not personal hap-
piness, but “greatest amount of happiness altogether” (Mill, 193:12). Mill 
does not deny that values can conflict, he acknowledges that different values 
are not always compatible and they will often clash. However, he does be-
lieve that moral conflicts can and should be resolved by the utility principle. 
In “Utilitarianism” he says that “if utility is the ultimate source of moral ob-
ligation, utility may be invoked to decide between… [different values] when 
their demands are incompatible” (Mill, 1993:27). The same goes for the 
competing notions of justice – when different notions of justice are in direct 
conflict “social utility alone can decide preference” as “from these confu-
sions there is no other mode of extrication than the utilitarian” (Mill, 
1993:61). There cannot be any true loss if we chose to act so as to achieve 
the ultimate end – the greatest happiness of the greatest number. If the end of 
all human action is happiness and avoidance of unhappiness, then values de-
serve to be called such as long as they help us to achieve this end. Values are 
then, ultimately, seen as a means to an end. For example, the reason why we 
call liberty a value is that liberty leads to personal flourishing, and personal 
flourishing leads to general happiness. Now, the choice between different 
means of achieving the same goal cannot be called tragic. As Berlin points 
out in the above quote, what makes a choice tragic and a conflict a true con-
flict is that different goals people strive for are not always compatible. How-
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ever, Mill’s view is that what we all try to achieve when acting rationally is 
happiness and therefore such conflicts as described by Berlin can be 
avoided, when we think in utilitarian terms. This is why the utilitarian view 
of resolving moral and political conflicts does not take into account the pos-
sibility of tragic choice. 
 Here we have to take into account Mill’s response to the critics of 
utilitarianism who claim that there are other ends to human action except 
happiness, which again suggests that happiness cannot be an ultimate value 
against which all other values are measured. Mill goes on to discuss the pos-
sible tension between happiness and virtue (Mill, 1993: 37-39). It is obvious 
that men desire virtue and desire it for its own sake, not as a means of 
achieving something else. Mill claims that this is true, but this only means 
that attaining virtue has become an essential part of one’s understanding of 
happiness. Virtue is, therefore, not a “means to happiness, but a part of … 
happiness” (Mill, 1993:38). The same goes for the love of money, fame or 
power. All of these values have been means of achieving happiness, but they 
can also become an inseparable part of one’s happiness. As Mill says “hap-
piness is not an abstract idea, but a concrete whole, and these are some of its 
parts” (Mill, 1993:39). This led Mill to a conclusion that “there is in reality 
nothing desired except happiness” (Mill, 1993:39). 
 This understanding of happiness raises two problems. First, happiness 
understood in such a broad sense cannot really be used as a reference point 
in resolving conflicts of values. If my notion of happiness can be something 
completely different from your notion of happiness, then it is not clear how 
we should resolve a conflict between our opposing notions. Let us say that 
an essential part of my understanding of happiness is money, while an es-
sential part of your understanding of happiness is virtue (a notion that in it-
self can be understood in more than one way). How are we to determine 
whose understanding should carry more weight? Even in our personal choice 
we might be faced with two conflicting ideas of happiness, both of which 
seem reasonable and worth pursuing, but unfortunately mutually exclusive. 
If we resort to the utility principle that would only mean that the majority’s 
understanding of happiness won over that of the minority’s. One can use the 
utility principle to guide them in their choice, but that does not mean that 
something valuable has not been lost. 
 Alasdair MacIntyre pointed out this problem in After Virtue when he 
wrote that “the notion of human happiness is not a unitary, simple notion and 
cannot provide us with a criterion for making our key choices” (MacIntyre, 
1981:63). MacIntyre acknowledges that Mill made an important step in his 
utilitarian theory by differentiating between the “higher” and the “lower” 
pleasures and in that way distanced himself from Bentham’s purely quanti-
tative understanding of notions of pleasure and happiness. However, even if 
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we know we should prefer the higher to the lower pleasures, this does not 
help in those cases when we have to choose between two or more lower 
pleasures or two or more higher pleasures. “To have understood the poly-
morphous character of pleasure and happiness”, claims MacIntyre, “is of 
course to have rendered those concepts useless for utilitarian purposes” 
(MacIntyre, 1981:64). The same line of argument has been voiced by John 
Gray in the beginning remarks of Mill on liberty: a defence – “a major fail-
ing of Mill’s argument is its neglect of the problems of the conflict of values 
in moral and political life and of the limited role that appeals to principle or 
theory can have in resolving such dilemmas” (Gray, 1983:18). He discusses 
the case of autonomy and security – these two values are connected as a 
certain amount of personal security is a precondition of any kind of autono-
mous action. However, when in extreme cases of natural disasters or wars 
general security is endangered, the autonomy of individuals might be sacri-
ficed as a measure for raising the level of security. In such cases, autonomy 
and security are directly opposed. Gray presumes that Mill personally would 
give priority to autonomy, but there is nothing in Mill’s utilitarianism that 
suggest that autonomy should be regarded higher in the hierarchy of values 
than security (Gray, 1983:126).  
 The second problem arises if we try to avoid the broad understanding of 
happiness and the kind of criticism that was presented by MacIntyre and 
Gray. This would mean that happiness has to be defined more narrowly. 
However, narrowly understood happiness cannot be a sort of umbrella value 
for all other values; it becomes just one of the many. In the cases where dif-
ferent values conflict, an appeal to general happiness is then as equally con-
vincing as an appeal to some other value such as duty or virtue. Again, when 
faced with a moral dilemma, the utility principle might not even always be 
the best way to go about resolving it. This is obviously not what Mill had in 
mind. As we saw earlier, Mill was convinced that utilitarianism can provide 
a solution to conflicts of value.  
 This shows that utilitarianism does not have an answer to tragic choice. 
Happiness can be understood either as ultimate telos or just as one of the 
many values, but in both cases we are faced with a possibility of loss. I 
would like to use two examples to illustrate this argument, one from the pri-
vate and one from the public sphere: Mill’s relationship with Harriet Taylor 
before her husband’s death, and the debate between Rousseau and the phi-
losophes about the character of civilization. In his autobiography Mill does 
not hide the affection that existed between him and Harriet Taylor, almost 
from the moment they met. No doubt that Mrs. Taylor was faced with a 
choice of staying with her husband or leaving him to marry Mill. If we take 
Mill’s account to be correct, they were not too worried about the opinion of 
others, but of discrediting and hurting Mr. Taylor – a “most upright, brave 
and honourable man” (Mill, 1971: 112). A choice had to be made between 
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two values – that of marital duty and that of love. Harriet Taylor’s choice 
was a tragic one – she could marry the man she loved and hurt the man she 
cared for or stay with her husband and be with the man she loved only after 
her husband’s death (given Mrs. Taylor’s and Mill’s moral character cheat-
ing on the husband was not a possibility). Her decision resulted in a loss – 
she had to wait for 21 years to marry the man she loved. Undoubtedly, had 
she decided differently and left her husband, she would have been faced 
again with a loss (of a different kind, but still a loss). Maybe she would have 
thought of herself as immoral or negligent of her duty towards the man she 
admired and cared for. Let us imagine that Mrs. Taylor behaved as a utili-
tarian and made a choice based on the happiness of all those affected by the 
consequence of her decision. It would be really hard to guess what her 
choice would have been without knowing exactly what her understanding of 
happiness was. Happiness can be envisaged in different enough ways to jus-
tify both possible alternatives.  
  The example that Mill uses to illustrate the importance of philosophical 
tolerance, both in the essay on Coleridge and in “On Liberty” is the debate 
on the value of civilization between Rousseau and the philosophes. The 
French philosophes praised all the achievements of modern civilization – art, 
philosophy, medicine, sciences, transportation and technology, destruction 
of superstitions and unfounded dogmas – all those accomplishments that 
contributed to lowering the level of human suffering. Rousseau fixed “his 
attention, not upon the value of these advantages, but upon the high price 
which is paid for them” (Mill, 1973:400). Rousseau talks about a loss of 
self-reliance, the rise of envy, the slavery to unnecessary wants, the dullness 
and monotony of the life of the average citizen, the praise of mediocrity at 
the expense of individual excellence, courage and energy. It is not important 
here whether Rousseau was right or not. It is enough to say that Mill thought 
that Rousseau was (at least partially) right in his belief in “the superior worth 
of simplicity of life” compared to the “demoralising effect of trammels and 
hypocrisies of artificial life” (Mill, 1993:115). Mill viewed Rousseau’s criti-
cism of the achievements of modern civilization in the same light as he saw 
Tocqueville’s warnings about the possible disadvantages of democracy – as 
a collection of useful and insightful ideas that can help us reform and better 
the society in which we live. When talking about the debate between the 
philosophes and Rousseau he says “all that is positive in the opinions of ei-
ther of them is true; and we see how easy it would be to choose one’s path, if 
either half of the truth were the whole of it, and how great may be the diffi-
culty of framing, as it is necessary to do, a set of practical maxims which 
combine both” (Mill, 1973:401). 
 This would mean that there is a way we can promote both the values of 
civilization of which the philosophes talked about and the values of uncor-
rupted and non-artificial life that Rousseau advocated. However, these val-
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ues cannot go hand in hand and it is not clear how we would go about mak-
ing compromise between them so as to ensure that all of them can equally 
flourish. The loss of the values of the noble savage is a price to pay for the 
benefits of civilization. This argument also reflects on the idea of progress – 
there is always a price to pay for progress. Even when progress is understood 
solely as an improvement in moral character, there are values which could 
contribute to such an improvement, as Rousseau himself suggested, that will 
have to be sacrificed for some other values. That is why we often find sym-
pathy for the previous eras in history – not only because of some romantic 
notion of Golden Age gone by, but because we know that certain values 
have disappeared from our own lives and from the life of our community.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this paper I have tried to argue that philosophical tolerance can be ex-
tended to be used as a tool for dealing with the tragic choice between con-
flicting ideas and values. Mill did not deal with the instances in which two 
conflicting ideas might be true or partially true but there is no consistent way 
in which we can accommodate them both. He believed that whatever ele-
ment of truth can be found in a certain idea, this could be integrated with the 
rest of the truth. For him truth is two sided but these two sides can be made 
to fit together. He did not discuss what role philosophical tolerance could 
play when one is faced with tragic choices because he believed that the 
utilitarian principle can provide us with an adequate answer when we find 
ourselves faced with such choices. I have tried to show that utilitarianism 
cannot really provide us with such an answer.  
 One obvious objection against my argument is that when Mill discusses 
philosophical tolerance he talks only about ideas, not values. There is indeed 
an important difference between ideas and values: values necessarily need 
social institutions and practices to sustain them. It is because opposing in-
stitutions and practices often cannot co-exist in the same community that 
certain values have to be sacrificed for the good of others. The same cannot 
be said about ideas: competing ideas can co-exist without a need to sacrifice 
some of them for the sake of others. Even when synchronizing two conflict-
ing ideas seems impossible, we do not have to dismiss one of them. Cer-
tainly, the existence of two ideas that both ring true but are mutually exclu-
sive might make us sceptical about the validity of one or both of them. How-
ever, if the value pluralists are right and not all social goods can exist to-
gether, then the existence of such two conflicting ideas is logically coherent.  
 This objection is valid, but I do not think it puts my argument in ques-
tion. First, philosophical tolerance can refer not only to conflicting ideas, but 
also to conflicting values because, as I have mentioned, specific ideas pro-
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mote specific values. Second, my goal was to show that philosophical toler-
ance can have more than just a corrective role. Mill was right in thinking that 
it is often possible to make a compromise between conflicting values or 
ideas, a compromise that both enriches and broadens those values or ideas. 
However, this kind of corrective role of philosophical tolerance is just the 
first step. Philosophical tolerance can also help us when faced with tragic 
choice, where different ideas or values are mutually exclusive. Imagination 
and discussion can help us recognize what is lost and what is gained by pro-
moting certain ideas or values. If pluralists are correct in assuming that there 
are rational and valid ideas and values that stand in irresolvable conflict with 
each other, then philosophical tolerance becomes an indispensable tool of 
accepting and dealing with the loss that such conflicts entail.  
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